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BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY: John S. Whitehead, Professor of History, 
University of Alaska at Fairbanks 
". the. enti.Jte economy and wealth o-6 AiMk.a today .i6 
bMed on. the. Jte.ve.n.uu -6Jtom the. PJtudhoe. Bay oi..f.. -6-ielt:16 which 
aiLe. tied dbte.c:tiy to -6tate.hood. • . . And -60, A£.Mk.aM -6ee 
the. :two tied toge.the.Jt. . . the.Jte. 1 -6 a ve.Jty po-6-<:V_ve. .Un.k. 
Whe.Jte.M , I think ..Ln. H awa..L 1 ..[, the.Jte. iA not any dealt-cut 
connec.t..i.on. Hawa..L 1 ..L 1 -6 economy .i6 not bMe.d on. the. ,O.ac.t that 
..Lt became a J.Jtate. .in 19 59. Hawa..L 1 ..[ 1 J.J population, the. .6-ac.t 
that people. came to Hawa..L 1..i., .i6 not baJ.Jed on the. -6-ac.t that 
..Lt wM ac:fmli;ted to the. wuon. So, the.Jte. 1-6 not that J.J..i.mp£.e., 
dealt Un.k between the. two in Hawa..L 1i that the.Jte. iA in 
AiMka." 
Professor John S. Whitehead, whose specialty is American history, is 
studying the statehood movements in Alaska and Hawai 1 i and their 
interrelationship. As part of the study, he is conducting oral 
history interviews with leaders of both movements. 
Currently, Whitehead is examining the pre-statehood constitutional 
conventions and the effect these conventions had on eventual statehood 
for both territories. 
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CC: Why don't we just start out. Why don't you give us your name and a 
little bit about your background--why you're here. 
JW: Okay. I'm John Whitehead, and I'm professor of history at the 
University of Alaska in Fairbanks. And the reason I'm here today is 
because this is the twenty-fifth anniversary of Hawai'i statehood and 
also the twenty-fifth anniversary of Alaska statehood. And over the 
last few years I've been engaged in an oral history of the Alaska 
statehood movement. And I discovered through talking with some 
people such as George Lehleitner that the Hawai'i and Alaska statehood 
movements were very heavily entwined together, but as they've been 
recorded over the last twenty-five years, Alaskans tend to write 
about their statehood movement oblivious to Hawai'i; and equally, 
Hawaiians tend to write about their statehood movement oblivious to 
Alaska's. So what I've been trying to do is to weave them together 
and see what effect both of the territories had on each other since 
they both entered the union within nine months of each other. 
CC: Do you have any preliminary assessment of that intertwining that you 
can report at this time? 
JW: We 11, what had happened was, it turned out that though Hawa i' i had 
always thought it would enter first because it was the more populated 
state--or the more populated territory; it was the area that had an 
economy which was supporting a terri tori a 1 government. Alaska was, 
on the other hand, much more the underdeveloped area. It barely 
had enough money to have a government, a very small population, 
virtually no economy except the mi 1 i tary in the years after the 
Second World War. But the impressions that Americans in what Alaskans 
call the "Lower Forty-eight," which you call the "Mainland," (had 
of the two} territories was quite different. And as a result, it 
really took both of the territories applying for statehood at the 
same time to get either one in. 
The reasons for this: Hawai'i had the development, but its multi-
racial population and, later, the fear that Communism was at work 
in Hawai'i led people in the Congress to have a negative impression 
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of Hawai•i. On the other hand, Alaska was seen by many Americans 
as the last frontier. It had basically an Anglo-Saxon population 
immigrated up from the United States, which by the time of the 
years after World War II was greater than the native Alaskan population. 
So Alaska was seen as sort of the last frontier of what would have 
been a popular view in the 1950s of 100 percent Americans. And so, 
Alaska had this sort of positive American last-frontier image, 
though it lacked the population and the economy. Hawai•i had the 
economy, had a population, but this multi-racial element and the 
Communist patina after the Second World War caused it, as I said 
earlier, to be looked on with a li .ttle bit of suspicion. But when 
the two got together, Alaska as one of the two territories could 
get a favorable view from people as, .. Wow, well, here•s the last 
frontier of Americans. They•re still out of the union. We got to 
bring the Alaskans in ... That•s what the supporters would have 
said. On the other hand, there was Hawai 1 i, and people could say, 
well, it has a developed economy and a population. So eventually, 
both of the assets of each territory helped to counterbalance what 
might have been the deficits if either one had tried to enter alone. 
If just Alaska was the last territory, people might have said 
there•s not enough people up there for it to become a state. If it 
had just been Hawai•i it might have, again, stood alone as this 
different off-shore territory with a different kind .of population. 
But I think, working together, that the attributes which both of 
the territories had led to the eventual successful admission of 
both. And . . . 
CC: Weren•t some of the opposition, though, based on some factors that had 
nothing to do with either of those exactly. And that is, that it was 
viewed, and probably correctly so, that the admission of both states 
would bring into Congress votes in favor of things like the Civil Rights 
Act or that kind of thing? Even Alaska, as you say, had a basically 
Anglo-Saxon--White, Anglo-Saxon--population, but still it was a liberal 
Democrat state. And wasn•t some of the opposition based on factors like 
that as opposed to the reasons you stated? 
JW: Some of the opposition was based on those factors, particularly from 
Southern congressmen who feared that both Alaska and Hawai 1 i would 
sort of help lead the way to civil rights, which they wanted to 
stop. But the interesting thing was, by the time of the mid-1950s 
the Southern delegations started to become split, so that it wasn•t 
a solid Southern opposition. Louisiana, which Mr. Lehleitner helped 
with, was almost 50 percent in favor of statehood. Both Alabama 
senators were in favor of statehood. And so, many of these Southerners, 
although having reservations about Alaska and Hawai•i, were starting 
to see that 'America was going to have a wider role in the world 
after the Second World War, and that Alaska and Hawai•i would be 
strategic positions in America•s growing global involvement. And 
so, some of the same senators from the South who might have been 
opposed to Alaska and Hawai•i for racial reasons tended to favor 
bringing the two in because they were going to be, shall we say, 
the frontiers of America•s new strategic position in the world. So 
many of the supporters of Alaska statehood in the Congress were 
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those you might view as internationalists, with one great exception. 
And that was J. William Fullbright of Arkansas, who was the liberal's 
liberal when it came to foreign policy but the conservative's 
conservative when it came to civil rights. So he opposed statehood 
for both Alaska and Hawai'i because in that one case, the civil 
rights or the racial issue outweighed in his mind the global aspects 
of foreign policy . 
CC: There's some other, perhaps, myths, but I'm kind of taken by what 
you said in terms of the two states complementing each other. And 
yet, in fact, the bills for admission for both states were considered 
separately. Alaska, of course, came first, much to the surprise of 
many people in Hawai'i; and then Hawai ' i, second. And I'm just 
wondering if, in fact, you give much credibility to the idea that 
this was part of a deal worked out between Jack Burns and Lyndon 
Johnson that was the magic formula for accepting statehood for 
Hawai'i, or in fact, would it have happened anyway? 
JW: Well, let's put it this way, the two states--even though I've 
previously emphasized the positive things they had to contribute to 
each other-when you look at how a bill passes through Congress, 
you add up your supporters. You also try to split your detractors. 
Now, {there were} enough people in the Congress who had different 
reasons for opposing Alaska or Hawai'i--the people who opposed 
Alaska said it didn't have enough people; those who opposed Hawai'i, 
it was the Communism, the multi-racial population. If you combined 
those opposition forces, they could defeat both bills. And in 
fact, what had happened in 1954 was that the Alaska and Hawai'i 
statehood bills had been joined together in the Senate, and it 
became clear {that} this process led to--well, the Senate bill 
later died in the House--that joining the two states was a disaster. 
If the two bills came in together, everyone knew that both would be 
defeated. So as early as 1954 it was clear to anyone who was a 
friend of Alaska or Hawai'i that a joint bill would lead to the 
defeat of both. So it was clear a long time before John Burns 
entered Congress that if either were to get in, the two bills would 
have to be handled separately. So that scenario was clear by 1954. 
When Burns entered the Congress or was elected in 1956--so actually 
wouldn't have held his seat until January of '57--by the time Burns 
arrived in Washington, Alaska had had its constitutional convention. 
Alaska had elected a so-called Tennessee Plan delegation which had 
arrived in Washington by December of '56. So, the ball of momentum 
had switched to Alaska, among other reasons, because there was still 
this lingering fear, which had been increasing over the years, that 
Communism was growing in Hawai'i. In fact, one of your governors 
Ingram Stainback reported in the mid-'50s that Communism was stronger 
in Hawai'i in '54 than it had been in 1950. So, rather that Communist--
at least what the Mainlanders were viewing Hawai'i as--that fear 
had been stoked up throughout the '50s. So that by the time Burns 
had arrived in Congress, it appeared that Alaska had the better 
chance to be admitted first for the simple reason that it had 
less going against it. And so, my view of Burns's contribution 
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was, if you're talking about a deal, what kind of deal could have 
been made? Since Burns had no vote, he couldn't have made a deal 
to vote for the Alaska statehood bill because he didn't have a 
vote. What I think he found out when he arrived in the Congress, 
since the Alaska delegate Bob Bartlett was a Democrat too, that to 
get Hawai'i in, what he needed to do was to let Alaska go forward 
first and support it, without saying to people, ,.If you go for 
Alaska, you'll have to go for Hawai • i... So, I think that what 
Burns's great contribution was, was to let the Alaska bill go through 
without tacking Hawai'i onto it at every step of the way. Because 
that took a great deal of restraint on his part. So, I tend to 
discount the deal for the simple reason there wasn't any need for a 
deal. 
CC: But in the ... 
JW: The path was politically clear. And so, a wise man would have gone 
for that strategy if he wanted to get Hawai'i in. And I think 
that's probably what Burns's strategy was. 
WN: Why do you think it took so 1 ong? If the momentum was a 1 ready set 
in '54 and '55, what did it take until '58 to actually get the 
momentum for putting Alaska in first? Or, is it because, do you 
think, Burns making the suggestion and following through with it? 
Or why didn't Elizabeth Farrington, for example, suggest it? 
JW: Well, let's see. Burns was elected (in) '56, if we can keep the date. 
The Alaskans had had their constitutional convention in the winter 
of '55 and '56. They elected the Tennessee Plan delegation in I 
believe it was (October) of '56. So the momentum had just passed, I 
would say, to Alaska just coincidentally at the time that Burns was 
e 1 ec ted the de 1 ega te from Haw a i • i . So then, when you got in to that 
Congress, which was the Eighty-fifth Congress, the question that then 
has arisen in many people's minds is, why was it not until May of 
'58 that the Alaska bill finally came forward? Poor Burns was having 
to hold back throughout most of his first term in the Congress. 
And why was the bill delayed? And the best I can find out from my 
conversations with George Lehleitner is that Sam Rayburn and Lyndon 
Johnson were not really friends of statehood for either terri tory. 
And Rayburn had delayed letting the bill go forward in the House 
until late in the second session. The story that we have in Alaska 
is that Sam Rayburn, though not a proponent of statehood, said to 
Bob Bartlett, the delegate from Alaska, .. I'm not for statehood, but 
I will let you have your day in court. I'll let---I'll make sure 
that the bill reaches the floor of the House and that it's voted on 
in this Congress ... So, there are those who think that really, Johnson 
and Rayburn were doing their best to kill the bill by delaying it 
as long as possible. 
CC: Or at least get through the next elections. 
JW: Yes. And I'll tell you this story. The man who fa the red--the champion 
or the quarterback of both statehood bills, Alaska and Hawai'i--was a 
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wonderful man from Albany, New York, named Leo O'Brien, who was 
chairman of the House Committee on Insular and Interior Affairs. 
He chaired both bills, floor managed them in the House. And I 
interviewed him in '81, right---a year before he died. And I said, 
"Leo, what do you think was the formula that got the Alaska bill 
through the Congress?" 
And he said, "I don't know. To this day, I have no clue why that 
bill got through the Congress. I said to my wife the day before 
the vote came, 'It's going to fail. Let's pack our bags and go 
back. to Albany. It's dead this session.'" "All I can tell you," 
said Leo, "is that Bi 11 Egan, the Tennessee Plan senator from Alaska 
who was an Irishman 1 ike myself, gave me a shamrock tie tack.. I 
wore it on the floor of the Congress when the bill came up, and the 
vote went through, and I threw up my hands and said it was a miracle." 
And when the bill went to the Senate--and I would point out, when it 
went to the Senate, Lyndon Baines Johnson was not present for the 
vote--Mike Mansfield managed the bill. And Leo O'Brien gave him the 
shamrock tie tack and said, "Mike, I have no idea how the bill will 
pass the House. You take this shamrock. tie tack and wear it and see 
if it brings you luck, too." And what most observers h~ve said is 
miraculously, in the very short time that was left, the bill passed 
the House May 21. It went to the Senate. If the Senate had substituted 
its own bill with any changes from the House bill, then it would 
have had to gone into conference and the session would have run 
out. Some people think. that • s what Sam and Lyndon were hoping for, 
who knows? But the Senate agreed to accept the House's bill without 
amendment. And this has been termed by many, I think including 
John Burns, as miraculous. And so, in all the interviews I've 
done, the only thing that asserts why the two got in or why Alaska 
got through both houses that summer of 1958 was a shamrock tie tack 
passed around among three Irishmen. 
(Laughter) 
WN: I've read that some of the Senate--one of the Senate tactics for 
anti-Statehood people was the filibuster. And they used it very 
well during the '50s. And I read where a possibility of a deal 
between Burns and Johnson was that Johnson will make sure that a 
filibuster does not occur. 
JW: In the 
WN: On the f1 oor. 
JW: On the Alaska bill? 
WN: Right. 
JW: That, I have never come across in any document. From what I have 
read, the evidence is, it passed the Senate with a pretty good 
majority. I think it was a two-thirds majority. Something like 
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sixty-four to twenty, something like that. Those who were going to 
block it saw the cards turning against them. And probably what is 
the truth is if Rayburn or Johnson had wanted to stop the bills, 
they could have. Now, whether that's the kind of support that 
should be honored in the pantheon of heroes twenty-five years later 
or not, I don't know. But I think the best you can say about Rayburn 
and Johnson is that they didn't block it. 
CC: Real quick, [Senator Henry] "Scoop" Jackson is also credited as a big 
hero of statehood. 
JW: Oh, dear. "Scoop" ••.. Well, he's dearly departed now. When we 
were having the Alaska statehood celebration last summer [of] the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the bill passing the Congress, "Scoop" 
was lauded as "Mr. Alaska." Knowledgeable people tend to think that 
of the two Washington senators, Senator [Warren] Magnuson was the 
friend of statehood. Again, there's a thought that Jackson, because 
he represented Seattle interests who profited with Alaska remaining 
a territory, was at best 1 ukewann to Alaska • s statehood, and that 
what his contribution was, was to let the bill reach the floor of 
the Senate. Again, his contribution was that he wasn't negative. 
You get this with a lot of people. Twenty-five years later, with 
Alaska producing most of the oil in the United States, people don't 
want to pretend that they weren't great friends of the state twenty-
five years later. So, there's been a lot of jumping on the bandwagon 
after the fact--of "Was I a friend?" back at the time. There were 
many more dedicated friends of statehood for both Alaska and Hawai'i 
than Jackson, Rayburn, or Lyndon Johnson. I always think they 
ought to get the credit for sticking their neck out. 
CC: Who do you think a couple of them were? Are we pau? Okay, let's 
just finish up with that. I'd like to hear your-assessment of who 
the rea 1 friends were. 
(Taping stops, then resumes.) 
JW: • • • through just as well 
CC: Without all that. 
JW: ••• without the myth. It took a lot of guts for him [John A. Burns] 
in his first session in Congress to sit back and just be criticized 
for doing nothing when he knew that was the only way to get the 
b i 11 accepted. 
CC: I think maybe that's a good thing to say. Because I think that's 
credit where credit is due. Why don't you go through that again, 
in terms of Jack Burns's contribution witn a lot of pressure to be 
actively for Hawai'i's statehood. 
JW: Okay. Keep in mind, Jack Burns was for Alaska statehood for one and 
one only reason: to get Hawai'i in. And so, Jack Burns often said, 
"I want Hawai'i statehood to be a successful bill, not just an 
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issue that I support." And to see statehood achieved, which meant 
to see a bill passed through Congress, I think Jack Burns's great 
contribution was to be able to sit back and 1 et the Alaska bill go 
through the Congress without making pronoucements that the Hawai'i 
bill wi 11 follow. He didn't make pub 1 ic pronouncements 1 ike that. 
That's what he hoped for, but he didn't go around confusing the 
Alaska statehood bill with an Alaska-Hawai ' i statehood bill. And 
if you consider that the Democrats had just come to power in Hawai' i 
in '54, Burns was the first Democrat to be a delegate [in 1956], it 
took an amazing amount, I guess you would call it, poise on his 
part to go to Washington, being the only representative of the 
people of Hawai'i, and basically to look like he was not supporting 
the issue he said he was in favor of, in order to get the bill 
passed if not in the Eighty- fifth Congress, in the Eighty-sixth 
Congress. And that took an amazing amount of guts on his part. 
And in fact, he later paid the price, getting severe criticism from 
the Republicans and then losing the first [gubernatorial] election 
after the bill had passed [in 1959]. So the man paid a price for 
the stand he took. But I think in that way, he should be credited 
for making sure that a Hawai'i statehood bill was passed after the 
Alaska one was completed. It was a strategy which seemed to be the 
only strategy that was going to work politically. And Burns should 
be credited for being able to step back. Because as you know, 
Hawai' i had wanted very much to be the forty-ninth state. In fact, 
quite frequently, when the bills had been introduced in the Congress 
for Hawai'i's statehood, there was a famous one, House Bill Forty-nine. 
And so, Burns was willing to be--in a way, you could say--Burns was 
willing to be the fiftieth state to make sure that Hawai' i would be 
a state. 
CC: What about the reactions--you've done surveys now with people in Alaska, 
your home state, and here in Hawai'i. You notice differences about how 
people regard statehood in those two places? 
JW: Yeah. And I think the reason is simple and obvious. As I said earlier, 
Alaska had no economy except a fishing industry which was controlled by 
Seattle interests, a little bit of mining that had basically died out 
by the Second World War, ~nd themilitary. As a result of statehood, 
the state of Alaska--remember when Alaska entered the union, only 2 
percent of all the 1 and was in private hands, the rest was owned by the 
federal government--Alaska was given a statehood grant of 105 million 
acres of land which it has yet to select all of it. But one of the 
first parcels selected in the statehood grant was what is today the 
Prudhoe Bay oil fields. So, the entire economy and wealth of Alaska 
today is based on the revenues from the Prudhoe Bay oil fields which are 
tied directly to statehood. So, for Alaskans, the style of life, the 
economy, their jobs, all come from oil directly or indirectly. And oil 
came directly from statehood. And so, Alaskans see the two tied together. 
In fact, when we did these oral history interviews asking the people who 
put together the state twenty-five years ago if they thought it was 
successful, even if they had been opposed to statehood twenty-five years 
ago, it was because they didn't think Alaska could ever support a state 
government. No one, I would say, with the exception of two or three 
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people, were predicting the kind of oil wealth twenty-five years ago 
which Alaska had today. So, the standard of living, the fact that 
there is a state government now which levies no taxes on the people, 
is all seen as coming from oil, and that came from statehood. So 
there's a very positive link. Whereas, I think, in Hawai • i, there 
is not any simple and clear-cut connection. Hawai'i's economy is 
not based on the fact that it became a state in 1959. Hawai'i's 
population, the fact that people come to Hawai'i, is not based on 
the fact that it was admitted to the union. So, there's not that 
simple, clear link between the two in Hawai • i that there is in 
Alaska. 
WN: So, in other words, when you do interviews with Alaskans, they would 
see statehood as a very---turning point in the history of Alaska or 
a watershed event? 
JW: Oh, yes. THE watershed. It created the economy. In fact, even 
those who were negative, the reason they said they were negative is 
that they didn't think there'd ever be enough money in Alaska to 
pay for keeping courts open. And so, the oil revenues, yeah, they 
see statehood as really the beginning of Alaska's history--in some 
ways. 
CC: And in Hawai'i, people don't trace their history to that event. 
JW: No. In fact, if you look at books on Hawai'ian history, statehood 
comes after about four or five hundred pages of something else, and 
usually occupies about two or three pages. So, it's not seen as 
the beginning which it is seen in Alaska. 
WN: Seems like in Hawai'i, it's the war--World War II .•. 
JW: Yeah. 
WN: was the watershed event. 
JW: The similarities between the two in what statehood did as I've 
talked to some people in Hawai • i and people in Alaska--and this, I 
think, is sometimes why Hawaiians are a little bit ambivalent about 
statehood. Before statehood, investors in the United States or 
Lower Forty-eight viewed both Alaska and Hawai'i as territories as 
some type of strange, foreign places, not places you'd want to go 
and invest your money. The result of statehood for both has been 
that Mainland investors have been much more willing to invest 
capital in both Alaska and Hawai • i. So the Alaskans see this in 
a very positive step, that it created the economy. You know, it 
made it---literally, made it possible to have schools. I think 
sometimes in Hawai'i, people see this great influx of investment as 
something that has maybe changed the standard of life or the style 
of living . 
CC: Well, there is, you know ... 
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JW: ••• that existed before statehood. 
CC: ••• two interesting things, I think. One is that in Alaska a few 
years ago, I know when I was---I traveled around up there a lot, 
there was a lot of people being madder than hell at the federal 
government and how these guys should---we should just go on our own 
because we now have all this oil and we can afford it. Who needs 
them anyway. And besides, they stop us from killing eagles 
and • • • 
JW: Whales. (Chuckles) 
CC: Whales, and -whatever they were mad at at the time. And at the same 
time, in Hawai'i, you know, there is a growing sense of concern, 
and disappointment, and some outright advocates that independence 
and a return to the Hawai'i as a nation is something that could be 
favored. And they trace back to statehood things like the sudden 
influx of people ••• 
JW: Tourists. 
CC: from the Mainland ••• 
JW: Yeah. 
CC: tourists, all that kind of stuff. So you do have, in recent 
past, in both places some voices raised against statehood. 
JW: Oh, yeah. In fact, there are still anti-statehooders in Alaska who 
are quite vocal. And from what I have been able to find out in 
talking to them, these were the old-line American frontiersmen 
types who came to Alaska to get away from government, and laws, and 
rules and regulations, and people. And so, you find a lot of people 
in Alaska who said, 11 I came up here to homestead. I came up here 
to get away from zoning, and plumbing permits, and electrical codes, 
and business licenses, and that's what I came to Alaska for. And 
what statehood has brought is government, whether it's municipal 
government or state government. And now if I want to build my 
trailer court, or my shopping center, I've got to go downtown and 
get a business 1 icense and a building permit. And some electrical 
inspector is going to come and observe it. And that's what I came 
to Alaska to get away from. 11 And that is, in a way, the base--the 
hard-core mentality of the anti-statehooders. 
WN: How about the native people of Alaska? 
JW: The native people of Alaska have profited greatly from statehood for 
this reason. Before Alaska entered the union, the old outstanding 
claims of native Alaskans to their land had never been settled. 
When Alaska was bought from Russia in 1867, a final settlement of 
the 1 and claims of Alaska natives had not been made and was just 
put on the boiler. Because, see, Alaska natives were never conquered 
nor did they ever sign any treaties with the United States. So 
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their land claims were in limbo all the way until the 1960s. And 
what happened, in a nutshell, was when the oil was discovered in 
Prudhoe Bay, then a decision was made by the oil companies to build 
a pipeline 800 miles across Alaska to the port of Valdez. In order 
to build that pipeline which was to be built first as a private 
operation, the right of way for the pipeline had to be cleared. 
And so, as a result, that forced the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement 
Act on the Congress of the United States. And you got what seems 
in some way an unholy alliance of all the major oil companies in 
the United States and the Alaskan Federation of Natives suddenly 
joining together. You rarely find capitalists and minority groups 
petitioning the Congress together. Finally, the Congress had to 
settle the claims of Alaska natives. And so, the result of the 
pipeline was what's called the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act 
which created (twelve) regional corporations (and a thirteenth 
corporation for natives outside Alaska) and transferred to roughly 
60,000 Alaska natives about forty million acres of land and almost 
a billion dollars in cash ($962 million). So that today, these Alaskan 
native corporations are the major domestic corporations in Alaska. 
They're the largest businesses that are owned within the state, 
because obviously, the oil industry is · owned outside the state. So 
as a result of this act, Alaska natives are now major economic 
forces within the state of Alaska. 
CC: Matter of fact, there's some of them speculating in land here in 
Hawai'i. 
JW: Yes. Yes, in fact, one of the---the corporation that serves the 
natives in the Fairbanks region where I'm from has refused to invest 
its money exclusively in Alaska and is famous for investing in 
hotels in Hawai' i. And in the city of Anchorage, many of the 
large---in fact, today, if you stay in one of the large hotels in 
Alaska, it's either owned by one of the White governors of Alaska 
or by a native corporation. Native corporations own the Hilton and 
the Sheraton. And two of our governors, Wally Hickel and Bill 
Sheffield, own the two other large hotels. So statehood, if you 
put it in this simple equation: statehood brought oil, oil brought 
the pipeline, the pipeline brought the Alaskan Native Claims 
Settlement Act. So, it's almost a textbook situation of everyone 
profiting. (By 1985-86, there is much commotion among Alaska natives 
over the potential effects of the Claims Act, and a fear that natives 
may lose their lands. Amendments to the Act are being proposed in 
Congress to save the land.) 
CC: And here, we don't have that kind of land base, and the indigenous 
minority, of course, keeps getting pushed off, further off, and further 
alienated from its traditional claims and traditional rights. And I 




JW: Yeah, yeah. 
CC: I th i n k that • s good. I think we got some good stuff, and it looks 
good. 
WN: Thanks a lot. 
JW: Oh, thank you. 
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